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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In their Afterword to the UC Irvine Law Review Symposium Issue, “‘Law As . . . ’: 
Theory and Method in Legal History,” Christopher Tomlins and John Comaroff signal a 
distinct intellectual moment after the “antimetaphysical revolution.”1 The antimetaphysical 
shift in legal studies was reflected in the work of twentieth-century progressive realists 
(Holmes, Pound, Dewey, and others) who revolted against formalism and promoted the rise 
and reign of the social sciences in law. The Law and Society movement is the zenith of those 
developments. It might be summed up, albeit reductively, as the tendency to lodge the 
problem of law elsewhere (“law and . . . ”).2  
 
“Law As . . .” provokes a line of inquiry that seeks to reinstate the significance of the 
relationship between metaphysics and history in legal theory. Tomlins and Comaroff (and 
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other contributors to the 2011 UC Irvine Law Review Symposium Issue) ask what legal 
theory and practice might gain from “rejoining metaphysics to materiality.”3 “Law As . . .” 
seeks to understand the conditions of possibility of the present in order to develop critical 
knowledge of the here-and-now. After Walter Benjamin, they search for the instances when 
“the origins of the present ‘jut manifestly and fearsomely into existence,’ spirit into 
experience, metaphysics into materiality.”4 Put differently, “Law As . . .” points to the 
methodological problem of re-uniting historiography with philosophy, or what after 
Foucault I will call the pursuit of a “historical ontology.”5  
 
“Law As . . .” concerns the appearance of statements—specifically juridical 
statements. These statements are an archive of the emergence of beings, things, power, 
institutions, offices, and jurisdiction. “Law As . . .” points to how each of these phenomena 
come into being through metaphor. “Law As  . . .” recalls Derrida’s elaboration of the 
difference between the presence of a phenomenon “as such,” and the trace of its 
appearance in a performative speech act—acting “as if.”6  
 
 In this essay I consider the ‘As If’ as it pertains to colonial and postcolonial 
sovereignty. The archetypical sovereign conceit (fiction) is to assert authority that is only 
retrospectively inscribed by law. That is, the legal inscription (writing, narrating, accounting) 
of sovereign acts comes after the event of a sovereign assertion. However, no sovereign 
assertion has a singular plenitude of its own ‘in the first place’. Bare force or arbitrary 
violence is hardly the raison d'être of sovereign power. I am thus concerned here with the 
being-together of sovereignty and law. Sovereignty is always moving towards or by way of a 
legal frame. The inscription and re-iteration of sovereign power is one of the primary 
functions of law. To that extent law is an archive of sovereign violence – inscribing and 
recounting the factual assertions (the constatives) and elaborate fictions (performatives) of 
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sovereign power. Law inscribes the historical narrative of sovereign violence, and provides 
the alibi. At the heart of this complex relationship between sovereignty and law is the ‘As If’.     
 
The ‘As If’, or the ‘consciously false’, has its modern roots in the thought of 
Immanuel Kant.7  In the 19th Century it was promoted by Hans Vaihinger, and elaborated in 
the 20th Century in the legal philosophy of Hans Kelsen.8 For the purposes of the discussion 
here I will draw on Jacques Derrida’s elaboration of the ‘As If’.9 The interplay of “Law As . . .” 
and “law’s as if . . .” points to the centrality of narrative, analogy, and fiction for how law 
goes about accounting for the past. An example from Australia, a society struggling to 
archive colonial sovereignty and inaugurate a postcolonial legal order, will illustrate how 
attempts to renew a legal system after histories of colonial violence both preserve and 
disavow such violence at the same time. Can colonial sovereign violence “as such” be 
grasped, isolated, and thus be disavowed? Or does colonial sovereignty continue to be 
reiterated through the conceit of an “as if”?  
 
The ability to distinguish the foundation of a colonial legal system from current law is 
seen as a central aspect of responding to the injustices of the past. Of course there is never 
consensus on whether the past can or should be adjusted. Many of the debates about 
histories of colonial violence concern what knowledge and responsibility present 
generations can attribute to the past. The “history wars” have been a site of this 
contestation. Which “truth” of the past should govern the call for recognition and justice in 
the present? This is a site, I argue, where the tension between the “as such” (a constative) 
and the “as if” (a performative fiction) presents itself. This tension also marks the sovereign 
reign of “Law As . . .”.10  
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I begin the discussion with two seminal cases from the Australian High Court – 
Mabo, and Wik. These cases exemplify the law’s complex archival function of at once 
inscribing, adjusting, and disavowing the violent excesses of colonial sovereignty. These 
cases illustrate the impossibility of a linear time of law or legal historicity. For instance, does 
contemporary law declare a fact as it was perceived ‘back then’ or declare what is ‘now’ 
understood to have been back then? The difference is significant as it goes to the heart of 
whether the law is merely recording facts (constatives) from the past or bringing them into 
existence by that very declaration. This temporal problem in law opens to a wider problem 
of whether legal history should be a redemptive narrative that seeks to address past 
wrongs, or offer an account of the context of past actions less concerned with remedying 
injustice. Is the legal historian, judge, or official to identify what was “missed” and put 
things right now? In the alternative, is history the “uncontrollable consequence” of 
contingent political struggles in a specific time and place? I consider these rival 
historiographical methodologies and their implications for how legal theorists account for 
the relationship between sovereignty and law. The antimetaphysical approach reaches for 
an account of law and the political as autonomous (here I consider the constitutional theory 
of Martin Loughlin). I challenge this approach and offer an alternative ontology of the 
relationship between law and sovereignty. 
 
We live in a time that appears to be obsessed with the ‘return of religion’ to public 
and political life. The fear is that the European enlightenment’s disenchantment of the 
world is in retreat. The call to cling to a non-metaphysical rationality is growing. It is in this 
climate that we should consider what is more widely at stake in the ‘As If”. My argument is 
that there is no way around the fictive narratives that sustain our social and political life. 
This will give little comfort to the rationalists or muscular liberals.11 But nor can we shy away 
from the call to do justice to the past – a task that will require new imagine constructions. 
My suggestion, drawing from Jean-Luc Nancy, is that a new ontology of sovereignty that 
refuses sovereign plenitude is part of what is necessary in the face ‘community’ that seeks 
to function as ‘law’. ‘Law-as-community’ is partly what is at stake in many sovereign claims. 
How will ‘law-as-community’ be confronted by a more deconstructive ‘law of community’? 
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A starting point, I suggest, is to demonstrate that sovereignty or community are far from 
autonomous, self-sufficient, or self-authorising. The existence of sovereignty and 
community rely on an exposure across limits – limits that are inscribed and re-inscribed by 
law.  
 
II. RIVAL LEGAL HISTORIES – SOVEREIGNTY “AS SUCH” AND “AS IF” 
 
A. Law’s Ground—“Now shown then to have been false” 
 
 In 1992, the High Court of Australia decided Mabo v Queensland.12 For the first time 
since the imperial occupation and usurpation of Aboriginal lands by the British Crown in 
1788, Mabo recognised that Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander peoples’ antecedent 
property rights, or “native title,” survived the colonial acquisition of sovereignty.13 This 
decision gave an account of the basis for the British Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty over 
Australia, the reception of the common law of England in the territory, and its 
consequences for the proprietary rights of Australia’s indigenous people.14 The colonial 
acquisition of sovereignty was based on the “barbarian theory”—the notion that the 
Australian territory was acquired by the British Crown, and the common law of England 
became the “law of the land,” because the natives were “barbarous or unsettled and 
without a settled law.”15 The High Court gave a retrospective account of how an inhabited 
territory was nevertheless regarded as “unpeopled,” or terra nullius.16 This is the “as if,” the 
fictive trace of the inscription of sovereignty, at the heart of Australian law and society. The 
High Court came to acknowledge that the entire edifice of the Australian legal system was 
built on the monstrous fiction that the native inhabitants were barbarians without a settled 
law. 
 
 The Mabo decision adjusted the common law in 1992 in order to recognise the 
antecedent property rights of the indigenous people. Two hundred four years after the 
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colonial invasion, the courts came to the conclusion that the natives were not lacking in 
social organisation and had proprietary rights in land and water from the outset of colonial 
settlement.17 These rights and interests, or native title, were retrospectively recognised to 
be a burden on the “radical title” (sovereignty, or imperium) of the Crown.18 While the 
Crown’s sovereignty remained putatively unassailable, the common law would now 
recognise that native title is a species of title that is (and would always have been) a burden 
on the radical title of the Crown. 
 
This takes us to the heart of the matter of doing justice to the past. Law-making 
violence and the injustice that accompanies it “jut[s] manifestly and fearsomely,” as 
Benjamin put it, into the present.19 In another register, the declaration that indigenous 
rights in land were always a burden on the radical title of the Crown was the moment of 
colonial sovereignty being “divided,” or separated, from a colonial past, and oriented 
towards a future “post-colonial” sovereignty and law. Sovereignty could no longer be 
regarded as an absolute monistic plenitude (nor could it ever have been).  
 
The demand for justice is partly about addressing a past assertion that does not, and 
could not, hold true. Sovereignty was always already fragile and divisible. The Mabo 
decision thus becomes an important instance of law archiving sovereign violence by way of 
instituting both a memory of past sovereign force and exercising a creative act of forgetting 
“now-abhorrent” colonial assumptions and practices. Law is an archive here in the sense of 
the double logic of violence that Renisa Mawani has attributed to its character as archive—
it is grammatological and epistemological, as well as ontological and material.20  
 
 In Mabo, the colonial assumption that sovereignty resulted in the Crown acquiring 
“absolute title” was distinguished from a “new” conception of sovereignty giving rise to two 
different forms of title.21 The divisible trait of sovereignty was found in the distinction 
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between radical title (colonial sovereignty) and beneficial title (various interests in land).22 
There was, however, a hierarchy of interests in land to be re-instituted.23 A variety of Crown 
grants in land and other actions would effectively extinguish native title.24 Many indigenous 
rights would be regarded as washed away by “the tide of history,” as Justice Brennan put 
it.25 Moreover, native title would only be recognised if it were found to be consistent with 
the claimant’s traditional laws and customs.26 Those laws and customs needed to have 
continued unbroken from the time of colonial settlement. Given the systematic destruction 
of Aboriginal society wrought by colonial governmental practices such as the coercive 
removal of Aboriginal children from their families, Christian missionary activity, and 
transformations in economic and cultural practices, it was invariably difficult for indigenous 
communities to establish rights in land that would accord with their erstwhile traditional 
laws and customs. In recalling Australian law’s origins, the court inflicted new conditions for 
memory and forgetting on indigenous people. 
 
The fact that the court was able to alter the concomitants of the colonial sovereign 
assertion points to how colonial law both sustains and disavows its fictions. The “barbarian 
theory” retained its reach over time—it was the “as such” (the constative assertion) on 
which the legal system and two centuries of dispossession were built. But the court was also 
able to render this sovereign assertion more malleable and subject to transformation over 
time. The “as such” was retained and converted. It was the “as if” character of sovereignty 
that purported to exist “as such” that enabled this malleability.  
 
 Later, in the 1996 decision of the High Court in Wik Peoples v Queensland—a case 
concerning whether native title and rights under pastoral leases could co-exist on the same 
land—Justice Gummow stated that the gist of Mabo “lay in the holding that the long 
understood refusal in Australia to accommodate within the common law concepts of native 
title rested upon past assumptions of historical fact, now shown then to have been false.”27 
This is a profoundly confessional moment for the Australian legal system. It is the admission 
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that the law is built on fictions and falsehoods. It is also a highly unstable speech act, 
disclosing an uncertainty about whether the error or falsehood is enacted “now” (the 
iteration of the “barbarian theory” in Mabo); whether it is the memory of what has 
happened “back then” (the account now of past assumptions); or whether it is the recovery 
of something missed or forgotten (though it is not clear if this is now or in the past). 
Bemoaning the lack of an “established taxonomy” to regulate “uses of history in the 
formulation of legal norms,” Justice Gummow wondered whether the gesture to shift the 
foundation would be regarded as a “rhetorical device devised to render past reality into a 
form useful to legally principled resolution of present conflicts.”28 It was all that and more! 
 
 Justice Gummow wished for an “established taxonomy” to regulate history.29 This is 
the language of the anti-metaphysicians and social scientists that have hitherto been the 
trusty servants of judges. Judges have come to be accustomed to taxonomies, hierarchies, 
and irrefutable facts that buttress law as calculation. But no such taxonomy exists. The law 
confronts its past and becomes, for a moment, lost in time. The court is disorientated by its 
own past fictions, which it must continue to rely on now and disavow at the same time. The 
speech act “now shown then to have been false” moves the common law of the 1990s back 
to its historical antecedents, but only within law’s own rhetorical gestures and textual 
inscriptions.30 The judges are the authors of this past and in the process it becomes 
uncertain whether they are determining “this” past, or whether “the past” (history) is 
determining what they do now. There are multiple moves here of inscribing, preserving, and 
disavowing the colonial sovereign foundation. Is the assertion of terra nullius as the basis for 
dispossessing Aboriginal people of sovereignty over their lands a falsehood propounded 
“back then,” and/or a convenient means of accounting for that dispossession today? 
 
 These questions have come to a head in debates concerning rival historiographical 
methods. Put simply, is the work of the historian a redemptive one—that is, concerned with 
the construction of narratives that would offer an account of how past misrecognitions can 
“now” be adjusted (in Justice Gummow’s terms, this would involve “now” recognising that 
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an error or falsehood was performed “back then”)? Or is it rather one of placing past 
injustices in a social and political context that can be discretely “contained” in a time “now 
past”? The problem here is the uncertainty of whether law, as an archive of the past, and 
the historiographical rendering of it, is a projection of the present into the past, or a 
retrospective recognition of what was always there to be discovered. The question I explore 
in more detail below is whether this is merely a problem of rival historical methods, or a 
wider metaphysical problem of law’s fictions that needs to be posed differently. In what 
follows, I examine rival approaches to whether past injustices can be addressed now, and 
how that can be done. Later, I suggest that the ungraspable character of colonial 
sovereignty—its apparent malleability—is better addressed as a problem of the ontology of 
sovereignty. For now, let’s consider debate among the historians. 
 
B. Rival Historiographies 
 
 A telling exemplar of historiographical rivalries about colonial sovereignty is 
presented in Ian Hunter’s account of the problem of political, rights-oriented and 
redemptive history.31 This he associates with the work of the influential Australian historian, 
Henry Reynolds. Reynolds’s historical work is widely associated with the progressive 
revisionism of the 1970s and 80s.32 This latter historiographical method is credited with the 
Australian High Court’s belated recognition of indigenous land rights in the form of native 
title in Mabo.33 The fact of this ‘belatedness’, this coming after what should always already 
have been, is itself at the heart of the historiographical dispute.34 Reynolds later went onto 
argue that indigenous Australians should have been regarded as a sovereign nation at the 
time of the colonial encounter, and that this sovereignty was now capable of recognition.35 
The Australian High Court has steadfastly refused to countenance Aboriginal sovereignty in 
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a series of cases.36 Nonetheless, Reynolds’ history, as with other social historians, seeks a 
perfectibility by way of adjusting past misrecognitions judged now to be capable of being 
done differently “back then.” For instance, Reynolds has argued that, judged by the 
standards and principles of natural law and the law of nations of the 19th century, Aboriginal 
peoples should have been recognized as sovereign nations.37 This past non-recognition is 
redeemable by recognition now. 
 
 Hunter’s critique of Reynolds is based on a historiographical dispute about the 
archive of natural law and the law of nations in relation to Aboriginal sovereignty.38 
Reynolds’ claim for the recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty is not based on a “weak” form 
of recognition within Australian constitutional law, but on a “strong” claim that it is a time-
immemorial right, rooted in the cultural and ethnic identity of the Aboriginal “nation.”39 
Aboriginal sovereignty is not dependent on recognition by the Australian state, but is rather 
capable of recognition as a universal right in natural and international law—the jus naturae 
et gentium.40 Reynolds locates the failure to recognize Aboriginal sovereignty in the 
judgment of Justice Burton in R. v Murrell.41 On Hunter’s account, Reynolds has posed a 
moral and metaphysical question—“were the Aboriginal tribes sovereign?”—and 
determined the answer based on the arguments of eighteenth-century Prussian philosopher 
Christian Wolff’s Jus Gentium.42 
 
The fact that Wolff’s text was not translated into English until the twentieth century 
is the key problem for Hunter. Reynolds deals with this on the basis that English lawyers of 
the nineteenth century would have encountered Wolff’s work via Vattel.43 However, Vattel 
is not helpful, as he distinguished dominium from imperium.44 Nomadic ownership was 
equated with the former, and so sovereignty would not follow from having dominium over 
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land.45 Hunter’s critique is that Reynolds has to drop the historical argument for a 
philosophical (moral and metaphysical) one: 
Reynolds appeals to the law of nations in order to establish the normative 
standpoint, common to us and our colonial forebears, within which 
Aboriginal sovereignty is rightfully recognisable, and in relation to which its 
denial (by Burton and the courts) constitutes a manifest injustice. In silently 
dropping his historical claim that the colonial jurists did indeed share this 
normative law-of-nations standpoint, however, Reynolds tacitly treats this 
standpoint as timeless and universal. In fact he treats it as grounded in the 
time-immemorial ‘ancestral rights’ of the Aborigines themselves and their 
recognition by a timelessly rational jus gentium. In this regard, he reactivates 
one of the programmatic imperatives of a particular tradition of the jus 
naturae et gentium: namely, to subordinate the positive law of the state to a 
higher timeless moral law.46 
This is a move that Hunter associates with anti-state social history—a move away from the 
level of law and the state, and towards reliance on a theory of the ideological determinants 
of society.47 
 
For Hunter, the Reynolds-type “redemptive historiography” rests on the idea of a 
“moral nation” that has fallen from its “high moral destiny.”48 It is a historiography, in 
Hunter’s view, that shares a “presentism” with the common law: “the view that past actors 
were governed by the same norms and purposes as their present counterparts—which 
permits the law to function as the trans-historical frame against which the moral history of 
the nation can be judged.” 49  Modern revisionist redemptive historiography is then 
compared with common law revisionism (and we saw this unfolding in Gummow’s 
judgment in the Wik case). Redemptive historiography and the common law both “view the 
law as historically grounded and yet timelessly present, in the sense that its past defects can 
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be judged and corrected in accordance with present norms that are treated as timelessly 
available to its original architects.”50 
 
 Hunter contrasts Reynolds’ social history of the law with the rival Cambridge school 
of analytical historiography, whose ambit is the “history of historiography” (a school of 
historiography that Hunter goes on to associate with antimetaphysics).51 Eschewing the 
“moral-nationalist historiography,” the analytic historiographers reconstruct the “context-
specific ‘languages’ of political thought.”52 The redemptive history that seeks to resolve 
historical exclusions is associated with the “revisionist historical sense of the . . . common 
law.”53 In contrast to this Whiggish history of immemorial rights “permanently present to 
reason”, the contextual approach of J.G.A Pocock is relied on54 It is seen as giving an 
account of public law arising from the “governmental will of a sovereign or state and is thus 
anchored to a particular time and place through the contest of political forces.”55 
 
 This focus on context and contingency is a modernist obsession that Tomlins 
characterizes as a post-Enlightenment philosophical position: 
Historicism’s roots lie in post-Enlightenment, particularly German, scholarly 
discourse, in the relativist proposition that all social and cultural phenomena, 
as well as the categories to which they belonged, the truths they were 
understood to convey, and the values that might be generalized from them, 
were comprehensible only by an examination of the historical context in 
which they occurred, an examination rigorously detached from any 
evaluative criteria belonging to the historian’s present that might distort 
comprehension.56 
This brings the antimetaphysical historiographical approach into sharper focus. On Hunter’s 
account the rights of Aborigines, including their right of sovereignty, was determined in the 
mid-nineteenth century by a conflict unfolding between frontier settlers, and the Colonial 
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Office in London.57  The settlers preferred a plural legality, a localized common law 
jurisdiction that sometimes opportunistically asserted that indigenous people had not been 
conquered.58 The colonial Crown, in contrast, asserted a unified jurisdiction over the 
territory in order to secure a stable and unified claim to sovereignty over the territory.59 
Both claims were inchoate, and wrought at the expense of indigenous peoples.  
 
For Hunter the variegated story about contested jurisdictions in colonial Australia 
emerges from a contextualized historiography—one that eschews the metaphysical moral 
claims about the rights of Aboriginal nations, or indeed the moral perfectibility of a fallen 
colonial Australian nation.60 Hunter promotes a rival historiographical approach to public 
law and constitutionalism which: 
[V]iews the state not as an agent responsible to and for the moral history of 
the nation, but as one whose normatively ungoverned actions—including 
colonisation—give rise to history as their uncontrollable consequence. If this 
is a historiography from which no moral guilt may be ascribed to today’s 
Australians, then it is equally one from which they may draw no moral 
comfort.61  
For Hunter, this is a history without the possibility of guilt or legitimacy. If colonial history is 
understood to invariably raise the question of the justice of being in place over time, then a 
contextualized historiography is incapable of providing a normative response. A position 
apart from the contextual and contingent forces on the ground is rendered unimaginable. 
Indeed, the place of the imaginary—the significance of narratives, fictions, and images for 
producing history—is devalued. It is a historiography with no place for justice. 
 
 Significantly for my purposes, Hunter’s assertion is that history is an “uncontrollable 
consequence;” and the various colonial impositions are normatively ungoverned, and 
certainly are not governed by the standards of legitimacy and justice that may now be 
brought to bear on past events. It is this tension between a historiography of redemption 
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and a contextual history that I seek to displace with an account of the ontological problem 
of sovereignty, which places colonial and postcolonial sovereignty inextricably in contact 
with law and normative frameworks. My point is not to suggest the possibility of a 
redemptive outcome—on that I am closer to Hunter than I am to Reynolds. It is rather to 
counter the anti-metaphysical tendency to displace the problem of justice. 
 
My suggestion is that a “Law As . . . ” approach offers a way beyond the rival 
historiographies that we have been considering. Michael Naas puts it well when he argues 
that Derridian deconstruction, before being a critique of phono-centrism and logo-centrism, 
and before even being a critique of the “metaphysics of presence,” is a “critique of the as 
that makes all presence possible.”62 Before being a critique of analogy, sovereignty, or the 
event, deconstruction is “a critique of the ‘as,’ the ’as such,’ and the ‘as if’ that make all 
comparison and analogy possible.”63 Deconstruction is a critique of the “authoritative or 
sovereign ‘as.’”64 What Derridian deconstruction sought to undo was the “sovereign reign of 
analogy.”65 We should thus seek the point of contact between philosophical accounts of the 
coming into existence of phenomena and historiographical problems. In sum, we should 
explore the relationship between ontology and history. 
 
Derrida takes the problem of the “as if” back to Kant. Derrida asks, “what if the law, 
without being itself transfixed by literature, shared the conditions of its possibility with the 
literary object?”66  He was referring to Kant’s second categorical imperative.67  In his 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant expressed the centrality of the “as if”: 
Because the universality of the law in accordance with which effects happen 
constitutes that which is really called nature in the most general sense (in 
accordance with its form), i.e. the existence of things insofar as it is 
determined in accordance with universal laws, thus the universal imperative 
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of duty can also be stated as follows: So act as if the maxim of your action 
were to become through your will a universal law of nature.68  
The “as if” introduces narrative and fiction to the core of legal thought.69 There is no history, 
genesis, or derivation of categorical authority. What is concealed and invisible in law is the 
“being-law” of law.70 The narrative or fiction of the law takes the place of an uncertain 
origin. 
 
 The implications of this approach to the being of law reach beyond rival histories of 
natural law in colonial Australia. The antimetaphysical account of the state is also central to 
debates in contemporary jurisprudence and constitutional theory. The autonomy and reach 
of the public law of the state is challenged by rival jurisdictions in postcolonial settings. As if 
sovereignty or law can be autonomous. The status and condition of that “as if” is what is at 
stake in these discussions: as if Australia was unpeopled and without a settled law; as if the 
colonial assertion of sovereignty reached a level of plenitude after its original violence. The 
question that comes after the recognition of “law as . . .” is whether human relations, 
including relations between rival laws—rival jurisdictions—can be represented as 
autonomous, as constitutionalists and public lawyers are prone to do. It seems as if that is 
precisely what is at stake in attempts to renounce metaphysics and theology in accounting 
for the ethics of judges, officials, and their rival jurisdictions.71 Here, I will focus on the work 
of the influential constitutional theorist Martin Loughlin, who has attempted a systematic 
account of the autonomy of public law.72 
 
C. Anti-metaphysics: the autonomy of public law and the civil state? 
 
 According to Martin Loughlin, “sovereignty expresses three basic features of the 
modern state: internal coherence, external independence, and supremacy of the law.”73 
                                                        
68
 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 38 (Allen W. Wood ed., trans., Yale 
Univ. 2002) (1785) (first emphasis added). 
69
 DERRIDA, supra note 63, at 190. 
70
 Id. at 192. 
71
 See generally SHAUNNAGH DORSETT & SHAUN MCVEIGH, JURISDICTION 98–116, 132–43 (2012).  
72
 The choice of Loughlin is partly due to the breadth of his account of public law, but more relevant to our 
discussion, due to his reliance on Ian Hunter at crucial points in his account. 
73
 MARTIN LOUGHLIN, THE IDEA OF PUBLIC LAW 75 (2003) [hereinafter LOUGHLIN, THE IDEA]; see also 
MARTIN LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW (2010). 
 16 
Political power, he argues, is independent of material factors—it is generated by the “‘living 
together of people.’”74 Drawing on Arendt, Loughlin claims that power becomes authority, a 
form of government, when it is manifested in an institutional form.75 Public power is 
political power harnessed in order to give it institutional form.76 It is only by way of a 
relation—society—that public power is sustained.77 This relation can give rise to a system of 
rules.78 The system is only sustainable by the “opinion and belief” that the system reflects 
the being-together, the being civil, by consent and choice, of equal individuals.79 This 
account of public power as the “action” of autonomous beings, the coming-together of 
equal individuals, is drawn from Aristotle via Hannah Arendt.80 The political is explained by 
the fundamental quality of plurality, one that is expressed through action and speech.81 As 
we will see later, this version of plurality is not able to sustain the autonomy of the political 
as I argue that the logic of “each one” is undone in modern democracy (in the “dis-position 
of beings”).  
 
 For Loughlin, sovereignty is a representation, a re-presentation of the relation 
between individuals.82 Sovereignty is a function of the being-together of individuals united 
by common action.83 Sovereignty is thus vested in the state. But how do we reconcile the 
relationship between the authority exercised by the office of the sovereign and the liberties 
of individuals that this office may curtail? In other words, how do we explain the 
relationship between authority and liberty? Loughlin, drawing again on Arendt’s “What is 
Authority?”, explains it through the Latin root of authority, auctoritas—which is drawn from 
the verb augere (to augment).84 Those in authority must augment the foundation—they 
must realize that authority is based in the “past,” that is, in “tradition.” Loughlin argues that 
tradition is a correlate of the people.85 The authority exercised by a sovereign is conditioned 
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on the autonomy of the rights-bearing autonomous subject.86 This is another point at which 
the quintessentially modern character of Loughlin’s account is revealed. The tension 
between authority and liberty/freedom doesn’t undo the “presence” attributed to the unity 
or commonality of people, tradition, and so on. The “past,” or tradition, can only be a 
“placeholder” of what in fact is an “empty place”—the empty place of power identified by 
Lefort.87 The sovereignty of the nation-state, as we saw in the discussion of Mabo and Wik 
above, is contested, unstable, and subject to revision. The past does present problems of 
authority and authorization. These can usefully be thought through the root of auctoritas. 
But augmentation is less likely to supply a stable unity than it is to expose the fragility and 
precariousness of the sovereign claim. 
 
 Loughlin does, however, agree that sovereignty, as an expression of a political 
relationship, is relational. It is impossible, he says, to conceive of sovereignty as an exercise 
of public power without considering the sovereign as a re-presentation of a political 
relationship, or as a person, organ, or office authorised to act on behalf of the political 
community.88 Sovereignty is the relationship between the “ruler and ruled.”89 It is an 
expression of this political relationship and is not a “thing” that belongs to one person or 
group.90 For Loughlin, sovereignty is thus both “legal” and “political.” As an expression of 
public power in its institutional, official form, it is legal.91 As the expression of a political 
relationship, let’s say between ruler and ruled, it is also political.92 From this is derived the 
assurance (and the assumption) that “[s]overeignty divided is sovereignty destroyed.”93 But 
how, then, is sovereignty both political and legal?94  
 
One way to approach this question is to consider whether it would be useful to 
approach sovereignty, law, and the political as ontological problems (a matter I turn to in 
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the next section). Loughlin seems to collapse all three problems into one.95 In this way, what 
is asserted to be a relation is returned as a monism—the monism of sovereignty as the re-
presentation of a relation between ruler and ruled, and indeed as the re-presentation of the 
political and the legal as one. Loughlin too readily associates sovereignty with law. He does 
this by arguing that the general will is given institutional expression through legal 
arrangements.96 Hence, the sovereign will is not arbitrary and absolutist, but legal.97 The 
sovereign may have the authority to make the law—in positivist terms, law is the command 
of the sovereign. But, for Loughlin, the “constitution of authority . . . is conditioned by 
law.”98 He starts from the position that sovereignty is an expression of the autonomy of the 
political. This autonomy manifests a political relationship that might be given an 
institutional/legal inscription in law. As with Ian Hunter, what drives Loughlin’s analysis is a 
disavowal of any metaphysical grounds of law or sovereignty. 
 
Loughlin’s account of public law is heavily influenced by Hunter’s antimetaphysical 
move. The key figures in Hunter’s account of a rival enlightenment are Pufendorf and 
Thomasius.99 His is an account of the state without recourse to a transcendent theological 
position, or to the post-Kantian position of a moral, ethical, or normative order independent 
of the state. 100  Pufendorf is the guiding figure for theorists who promote an 
antimetaphysical and post-theological sense of public law. For Loughlin, drawing on 
Hunter’s scholarship, Pufendorf makes the “decisive break by severing natural law from 
theology and ethics.”101 This enables “politics” to be identified as an “autonomous realm,” 
and “natural law to be transmuted into droit politique,” or “political right.”102 Departing 
from the Hobbesian primacy of positive law as the emanation of the sovereign will, 
Pufendorf’s natural law and Montesquieu’s fundamental law are seen as conditioning and 
maintaining an autonomous political realm.103 In determining the relationship between 
politics and morality, the autonomy of the political is given primacy: “Moral life cannot exist 
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without economic and political life having first been established, and the ethical spirit is a 
vital aspect of political life.” 104  Rejecting the Kantian categorical imperative as a 
transcendental law that can guide governmental authority and ensure civil peace, Loughlin 
sees public law as “an expression of the immanent precepts of an autonomous discourse of 
politics.”105  
 
 The lack of an authoritative transcendental morality means that there is no 
resolution of incommensurability—between peoples, jurisdictions, or ruler and ruled—to be 
found outside public reason. What then is the source of unification? In the end, and 
somewhat surprisingly, Loughlin reaches for the imaginary. We will have to proceed “as if” 
after all! It is “image” and “metaphor”—for instance, the image of Machiavelli as the 
mapmaker for the prince—that takes the place of metaphysics. Moreover, this is an account 
of “public reason” as “reason of state.” Much is optimistically expected of raison d’état. It 
must promote the public good, have due regard for morality and justice, and prudentially 
adhere to law.106 If politics is guided by neither science nor metaphysics, from where does 
the “prudential method” derive its content? Politics is a practical activity whose judgments 
involve “analogical reasoning and is a form of casuistry”: 
Although casuistry today has lost much of its respectability in certain circles, 
it remains an effective method of dealing with practical problems, especially 
those that involve conflicting obligations. Casuistry operates by applying old 
illustrations to new problems—a dialectic between paradigm case and novel 
circumstance—and creates a type of knowledge that is not easily 
generalizable. In so doing, it replicates politics itself.107 
Applying “old illusions” to “new problems;” the centrality of image and metaphor—they all 
point to something other than the material, mundane, and contextual determining the 
outcomes of legal and political conflicts (recall Hunter’s point about colonial violence 
above). However, this is difficult to sustain when the overall orientation is away from 
metaphysical determinations. 
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This antimetaphysical approach can be compared to critical legal history (CLH) and 
critical legal studies (CLS). As Tomlins has put it, they are both forms of: “skeptical 
antimetaphysical modernism that adapts Weberian wheels to non-Weberian purposes, a 
disenchanting mode of historical analysis, that ‘strips [law] of its metaphysical dignity, unity, 
and coherence by exposing law as the outcome of mundane and profane processes and 
interests.’”108 So, antimetaphysicians like Hunter and Loughlin face a contradiction. They 
disavow metaphysics in order to get closer to “reality.” This is done to reveal the true 
determination of experiences, decisions, and events. But a metaphysical ghost haunts the 
contextualist. The fictional assertions of the sovereign remain inchoate. The imagery and 
symbolism of sovereignty assert a unity that is nowhere to be found. 
 
What law sees and does not see, what it recognizes, misrecognizes, or excludes 
becomes a problem of what there is in relation to law. This is an ontological question 
concerning the existence and relation of law and sovereignty. There persists, then, a need to 
account for the being of the sovereign authority that faces the problem of legitimation, and 
the being of the political community without which the singular subject would be a logical 
contradiction (you cannot “be alone being alone,” as Jean-Luc Nancy has put it).109  
 
When Justice Gummow was reaching for a taxonomy to account for the “shift” or 
transformation of the foundation of Australian law in Wik v Queensland, what lay behind his 
anxious query was the being of colonial and postcolonial sovereignty. Was sovereignty 
capable of being altered, re-positioned, or re-posited? The account of colonial sovereignty 
before the Mabo decision had, it seemed, been altered. How is such an alteration possible 
when a fulsome foundational sovereignty is supposed to be immovable and indivisible? In 
what follows, we will examine how the historiographical problem of law and sovereignty 
gives rise to an ontological question concerning the relation of sovereignty to law. 
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III. AN ONTOLOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY 
 
A. Undoing sovereign autonomy and ipseity 
 
 The first task in elaborating the being of sovereignty is to tackle its purported 
singular presence and plenitude. Sovereignty, as we have observed above, is regularly 
expressed as wholly autonomous, indivisible, and illimitable. Sovereignty apparently 
gives itself to itself (ipseity). What traces of sovereign appearance and alteration 
provide insights to the ontological relation of sovereignty and law? 
 
In the opening pages of Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, Jacques Derrida refers to 
“The Wolf and the Lamb,” a poem from La Fontaine.110 This poem expresses the 
question, “who has the ability, right, or power to decide on the law,” and with what 
force. Derrida puts it like this: “But just who has the right to give or to take some right, 
to give him- or herself some right [droit] or the law [droit], to attribute or to make the 
law in a sovereign fashion? Or the right to suspend law in a sovereign way?”111 Carl 
Schmitt authored one of the most influential responses to Derrida’s question in the 
modern tradition. He gave an account of the secularized theology of sovereign power, 
drawn from the “outermost sphere” of limit-situations, as he called them.112 For 
Schmitt, the sovereign exception grounds and conditions a normative order.113 For 
Schmitt, sovereignty is a creature of the limit situation.114 Sovereignty determines 
limits, but is in movement within and outside of a frame.115 In constituting a legal order, 
sovereignty is in movement towards a frame of reference, a normalised political 
condition.116 The illimitable sovereign thus moves towards and by way of a limit. It 
could also be said that the illimitable exists in and through a limit. As Derrida puts it, 
once the indivisible is divided, and the illimitable is limited, sovereignty, as the 
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“undivided” and “unshared,” becomes an impossible possibility.117 This is in contrast to 
the singular plenitude of sovereignty, which is often asserted: 
[I]s not the very essence of the principle of sovereignty, everywhere and in every 
case, precisely its exceptional indivisibility, its illimitation, its integral integrity? 
Sovereignty is undivided, unshared, or it is not. The division of the indivisible, 
the sharing of what cannot be shared: that is the possibility of the impossible.118 
What is crucial here is the insight that whatever divides—and the sovereign limit 
divides—also “shar[es] itself” in this partition.119 The singular plenitude of the 
sovereign decision thus deconstructs itself at the “frontier” of the division it cuts.120 
 
 For Derrida, sovereignty is at once indivisible and unconditional. As the 
indivisible, it is absolute, complete, a sovereign plenitude.121 This sovereign plenitude is 
first figured as the “I” of the “I can”—or ipseity.122 In a moment, I shall return to the 
undoing of ipseity, or the autotelic subject at the heart of the demos and its re-
presentation as sovereignty/democracy. As the unconditional, sovereignty is neither “as 
such” nor “as if”—neither “constative” nor “performative.”123 Derrida affirms the 
unconditional renunciation of sovereignty, but an unconditional renunciation of 
sovereignty, which needs another sovereignty, perhaps. 124  The unconditional is 
heterogeneous and rebellious, but irreducible to law, power, or any “economy of 
redemption.”125  
 
 Ipseity is akin to auto in Greek.126 It is from ipse that one extracts the possibility 
of giving oneself law, or asserting self-determination. Democracy can only be imagined 
with the assertion of this ipse/auto—the autonomous, self—as the same subject. Ipseity 
is also the condition of “being-together,” “living together”—because before the plural 
will exists, there needs to be the possibility of the singular—the auto or ipse of the self. 
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This ipseity is at the heart of liberal ontology, and is what Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy 
call into question. 
 
The possibility of an “I can” by myself, that is, this ipseity, is named in order to 
call it into question. This involves calling into question the “assembling” of the 
“resembling ensemble,” the simulacra of resemblance, the simulation that is the act of 
making similar.127 To say “I can” is the key condition of many liberal/modern 
concepts/practices (and some of these, of course, self-identify as having a classical 
Greek pedigree): possession, property, power, husband, father, son, proprietor, seignior, 
sovereign, host, or master. Think, also, of the possessive individual from Hobbes and 
Locke. There can be no sovereignty, no liberal democracy, or any of those social 
contract theories, without this notion of ipseity.128 
 
 In modern accounts of democracy, the individual, autonomous being becomes 
one with a “people"/nation, authorizes subjection to a sovereign, or holds sovereignty 
as one-of-the-many. Democracy is a force in the form of a sovereign authority (as reason 
and decisiveness), and a representation of the power and ipseity of a people. It is in this 
sense that Derrida’s trope of the “wheel,” at once violence, torture, and repetition, 
applies to democracy.129 In democracy, power is not held by any one person, it is held 
by “everyone and no one.” But this “everyone” cannot be just “anyone.” Recall the 
calculations, the “who counts?” in all friendship and democracy.130 This demand for 
openness to “everyone” will come to undo democracy (as with democracy’s many auto-
immunities, which I will not pursue here). The demand of “everyone,” as equal worth 
and freedom, is always already the undoing of democracy. The authorization of the 
exercise of power in modern democracy must constantly return to its source, its 
authorization. While the axiomatic of democracy as circle, sphere, ipseity, autos of 
autonomy, symmetry, homogeneity, semblance and similarity, and God, which is the 
analogy in the American Declaration, are all ways of expressing the autonomy of the 
political, Derrida identifies the double bind within this tradition of democracy. Each of 
these elements are incompatible and clash with the “truth of the democratic,” namely 
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the other, heterogeneity, dissymmetry, multiplicity, the anonymous “anyone,” and the 
“each one.”131 Sovereignty, as the ipseity at the heart of democracy, represents a stilling 
of an infinite order of time (even as patricide, regicide).132 But this ipso-centric order, 
this autonomy of the political as democracy or other formations of community, undoes 
itself. The double bind of ipseity, the clash of the “I can” with the autonomy of 
“everyone”—in other words the problem of “being-singular-plural”—can be taken up as 
the problem of all finitude through the work of Jean-Luc Nancy. 
 
 To recall our discussion above, the autonomy of the political is asserted by 
theorists like Loughlin as the manifestation of a political/legal relationship. Sovereignty 
is the re-presentation of this autonomy—one that, in a Schmittian mode, can be 
conceived as the preoccupation with the political and juridical limit of sovereignty. But 
sovereignty is neither a bounded unity nor an illimitable institution. I have transposed 
this question of the sovereign limit and the autonomy of the political into the internal 
undoing of all autos or ipseity in the democratic demand itself. Ipseity is both the 
condition and undoing of self-determination. I will elaborate this undoing of autonomy 
through Jean-Luc Nancy’s thought on the finitude of being.  
 
 
 
 
B. Jean-Luc Nancy: The Impossibility of Finite/Infinite Sovereignty 
 
 In “The Inoperative Community,” Nancy calls into question the possibility of an 
“absolute,” atomistic subject, as individual or state, which exists entirely “for-itself.”133 
According to Nancy, the individual subject, or “total State,” cannot be “perfectly 
detached, distinct, and closed.”134 Nancy sets out to establish that every finite, atomistic 
being, whether that is the individual subject or a State, implies a relation in its 
separation: 
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A simple and redoubtable logic will always imply that within its very 
separation the absolutely separate encloses, if we can say this, more than 
what is simply separated. Which is to say that the separation itself must 
be enclosed, that the closure must not only close around a territory 
(while still remaining exposed, at its outer edge, to another territory, with 
which it thereby communicates), but also, in order to complete the 
absoluteness of its separation, around the enclosure itself. 135 
The “limit” that marks the separation of a being (let’s say of an individual or state), in 
order to be absolutely separate, would have to be so thoroughly and “purely” enclosed 
that it would not communicate on its outer edge with the subject, territory, or space 
beside it. Such an absolute separation, Nancy argues, is impossible “to be absolutely 
alone, it is not enough that I be so; I must also be alone being alone—and this of course 
is contradictory.”136 The idea of a finite being violates itself to the extent that this 
finitude implies a separation that is at once a “communication” “with . . . .” One cannot 
say what is “beside” (“with . . .”) finitude precisely because of the impossibility of “being 
alone.” In asserting its separateness, the absolute is undone by the “relation” 
(communication, community) to which “it” is exposed.137 The “relation” that this 
“communication” implies violates the “essence” (as “absolute”) that an “absolute” finite 
being asserts for itself. Finitude is impossible because being finite implies 
communication and relation. It is therefore in the “logic of the absolute” that 
“community comes perforce to cut into” the subject/being/state.138 It is this critique of 
finitude that I wish to bring to bear on the “ipseity” of sovereignty as a discrete “event” 
which was discussed above. The critique of finitude elaborates the undoing of 
democracy, for instance, as the sharing of plural beings—the “everyone” cuts into the 
autonomy of the political built on the “each one.” 
 
For Nancy, “finitude itself is nothing.”139  It is not a ground, essence or 
substance.140 Finitude is always a sharing. Nancy persistently makes the point, in 
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several texts, that “there is no original or origin of identity”141 which takes form through 
“exclusion.”142 Rather than a self-sufficient being, or a being constituted by exclusion, 
Nancy proposes the original “dis-position” of beings.143 For Nancy, the “origin” of being 
is a “dis-position.”144 There is no purely delimited “outside” that grounds or constitutes 
being. I will briefly set out what Nancy means by original “dis-position.”  
 
 Nancy approaches this question through an account of the origin, which refuses 
an essential ground of being-in-common through reason or humanity—the appeal to 
“one-origin.”145 Instead he proposes an ontology of origin where access to an origin is 
refused by its concealment in multiplicity.146 “We” can’t identify ourselves in or as the 
origin—“we” can only identify with it. 147  Nancy refers to this as “originary 
coexistence.”148 To hazard putting this simply, I am a singular being among a 
multiplicity of other singular beings. I, like every other “I” am originarily singular, but it 
is a singularity that is at once plural: the latin singuli means “one by one” (a word that 
exists only as a plural).149 The “other” of a singular being-origin is not the “essential 
stranger who is opposed to what is proper,”150 as in many constructivist accounts. The 
other of being-origins is “‘one of the two.’”151 “This ‘other’ . . . is ‘one’ among many 
insofar as they are many; it is each one, and it is each time one, one among them, one 
among all and one among us all.”152 Each one is the other origin of us all, because we 
cannot “be alone being alone.” I am, we are, singular plural. In this way, the “being-with” 
is never secondary to an origin.153 The origin itself is a coexistence of origins. The 
“origin” is not to be found “outside” being. This is essentially what is expressed in the 
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phrase “being singular plural”: “The plurality of beings is at the foundation [fondment] of 
Being.”154  
 
 Finitude appears, is exposed, and thus exists as communication.155 Finitude “co-
appears,” “compears.”156 That is, finite being always presents itself together: “[F]or 
finitude always presents itself in being-in-common and as this being itself, and it always 
presents itself at a hearing and before the judgment of the law of community, or, more 
originarily, before the judgment of community as law.”157 A finite, singular being (one 
that I take to be indicative of a monistic sovereign—that is to say, also indicative of the 
impossibility of such monism) presents itself, according to Nancy, before the “law of 
community” and “community as law.”158 What is this “law of community” before which 
finitude presents itself? What does it mean to say that finitude is “more originarily” 
presented before the “judgment” of “community as law”? The “law of community” 
connotes the ontology of “being-in-common.” Being-in-common is how finitude always 
presents itself. “Community as law” is the presentation, or the originary co-
presentation, the co-presence of finitude. There is no one origin. Nancy confirms this in 
a later reflection on the “The Inoperative Community”, when he claims that:  
[T]here has been, already, always already, a ‘work’ of community, an 
operation of sharing out that will always have gone before any singular or 
generic existence, a communication and a contagion without which it 
would be unthinkable to have, in an absolutely general manner, any 
presence or any world, since each of these terms brings with it the 
implication of a co-existence or of a co-belonging.159 
The origin is always already a co-origination. This is the law of community that Nancy 
refers to in “The Inoperative Community.”160 The “presence” of a sovereignty is always 
already a co-appearance.161 
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 Sovereignty is a relational concept that involves a “sharing” across limits. This 
offers one approach through which the “presence” of sovereignty can be called into 
question. Indeed, the very “place” of sovereignty as unity and essence must be undone. 
Sovereignty is neither readily limitable nor is it infinite and illimitable. Sovereignty is in 
constant movement in relation to a frame or limit. That frame or limit is law. In our 
discussion here, that limit has been marked by the difference between colonial and 
postcolonial law. Colonial law never achieved the plenitude and presence that had been 
asserted in its name. Law’s capacity to alter the account of the foundation of Australian 
law drew attention to the narrative and fiction—the “as if”—that grounds law.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 The formulation “now shown then to have been false” manifests the complexity of 
law’s archival function. Law inscribes its own history by narrating and re-iterating the “as if” 
that grounds its jurisdiction. In the process, a contested colonial sovereign assertion—an 
origin of law that never took place as a singular event—is divided and altered. But it is only 
one account after all—yet another dissimulation of sovereignty that will come again to 
haunt the law. In that sense, colonial legal history is not amenable to a redemptive account, 
or to a contextual account untroubled by contemporary ethical and political demands. 
 
The work of assembling the history of colonial violence requires more than a 
pragmatic assemblage of what can be usefully known or admitted now. The latter continues 
to form the limits of how courts deal with colonial sovereignty—shielded by the common 
law’s practice of deciding only what is before the court at a particular moment in time. Such 
a memorial process will inscribe forgetting along with the act of remembering. This is law’s 
“act of literature”—its “as if.” Assembling the archive (law’s memorial practices) opens new 
fissures and gaps that will in turn require a new imaginary edifice, new “as ifs” to be 
constructed. As soon as law remembers, there will, it seems, be an impetus to forget.  
